Primaries
Cal. Constitution Art. II sec. 5
Article 2: Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and Recall
Sec. 5. (a) A voter-nomination primary election shall be conducted to select the candidates for congressional and state elective offices in California. All voters may vote at a voter-nominated primary election for any candidate for congressional and state elective office without regard to the political party preference disclosed by the candidate or the voter, provided that the voter is otherwise qualified to vote for candidates for the office in question. The candidates who are the top two vote-getters at a voter-nominated primary election for a congressional or state elective office shall, regardless of party preference, compete in the ensuing general election.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by Section 6, a candidate for a congressional or state elective office may have his or her political party preference, or lack of political party preference, indicated upon the ballot for the office in the manner provided by statute. Apolitical party or party central committee shall not nominate a candidate for any congressional or state elective office at the voter-nominated primary. This subdivision shall not be interpreted to prohibit a political party or party central committee from endorsing, supporting, or opposing any candidate for a congressional or state elective office. A political party or party central committee shall not have the right to have its preferred candidate participate in the general election for a voter-nominated office other than a candidate who is one of the two highest vote-getters at the primary election, as provided in subdivision (a).
c) The Legislature shall provide for partisan elections for presidential candidates, and political party and party central committees, including an open presidential primary whereby the candidates on the ballot are those found by the Secretary of State to be recognized candidates throughout the nation or throughout California for the office of President of the United States, and those whose names are placed on the ballot by petition, but excluding any candidate who has withdrawn by filing an affidavit of noncandidacy.
(d) A political party that participated in a primary election for a partisan office pursuant to subdivision (c) has the right to participate in the general election for that office and shall not be denied the ability to place on the general election ballot the candidate who received, at the primary election, the highest vote among that party’s candidates.
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)
Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the State of California may, consistent with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, use a so-called “blanket” primary to determine a political party’s nominee for the general election. [Political scientists refer to this system as an “open primary”.]
Until 1996, to determine the nominees of qualified parties California held what is known as a “closed” partisan primary, in which only persons who are members of the political party—i.e., who have declared affiliation with that party when they register to vote—can vote on its nominee. In 1996 the citizens of California adopted by initiative Proposition 198 [which] changed California’s partisan primary from a closed primary to a blanket primary. Under the new system, “all persons entitled to vote, including those not affiliated with any political party, shall have the right to vote … for any candidate regardless of the candidate’s political affiliation.” Whereas under the closed primary each voter received a ballot limited to candidates of his own party, as a result of Proposition 198 each voter’s primary ballot now lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them. It remains the case, however, that the candidate of each party who wins the greatest number of votes “is the nominee of that party at the ensuing general election.
Petitioners in this case are four political parties—the California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party—each of which has a rule prohibiting persons not members of the party from voting in the party’s primary. The District Court held that the burden on petitioners’ rights of association was not a severe one, and was justified by state interests ultimately reducing to this: “enhancing the democratic nature of the election process and the representativeness of elected officials.” The Ninth Circuit, adopting the District Court’s opinion as its own, affirmed. We granted certiorari.
Representative democracy in any populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political views. The Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects “the freedom to join together in furtherance of common political beliefs,” which “necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to those people only.” That is to say, a corollary of the right to associate is the right not to associate. “‘Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if associations could not limit control over their decisions to those who share the interests and persuasions that underlie the association’s being.’ ”
In no area is the political association’s right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its nominee. That process often determines the party’s positions on the most significant public policy issues of the day, and even when those positions are predetermined it is the nominee who becomes the party’s ambassador to the general electorate in winning it over to the party’s views.
Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with—to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by—those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival. In this respect, it is qualitatively different from a closed primary. Under that system, even when it is made quite easy for a voter to change his party affiliation the day of the primary, and thus, in some sense, to “cross over,” at least he must formally become a member of the party; and once he does so, he is limited to voting for candidates of that party. The evidence in this case demonstrates that under California’s blanket primary system, the prospect of having a party’s nominee determined by adherents of an opposing party is far from remote—indeed, it is a clear and present danger.
Proposition 198 forces petitioners to adulterate their candidate-selection process—the “basic function of a political party,” —by opening it up to persons wholly unaffiliated with the party. Such forced association has the likely outcome—indeed, in this case the intended outcome—of changing the parties’ message. We can think of no heavier burden on a political party’s associational freedom. Proposition 198 is therefore unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. It is to that question which we now turn.
[Justice Scalia then reviewed all reasons proffered by the state to prove that the state’s interest was compelling enough to meet strict scrutiny standards, and rejected each of them. Ed.]
Finally, we may observe that even if all these state interests were compelling ones, Proposition 198 is not a narrowly tailored means of furthering them. Respondents could protect them all by resorting to a nonpartisan blanket primary. Generally speaking, under such a system, the State determines what qualifications it requires for a candidate to have a place on the primary ballot—which may include nomination by established parties and voter-petition requirements for independent candidates. Each voter, regardless of party affiliation, may then vote for any candidate, and the top two vote getters (or however many the State prescribes) then move on to the general election. This system has all the characteristics of the partisan blanket primary, save the constitutionally crucial one: Primary voters are not choosing a party’s nominee. Under a nonpartisan blanket primary, a State may ensure more choice, greater participation, increased “privacy,” and a sense of “fairness”—all without severely burdening a political party’s First Amendment right of association.
Respondents’ legitimate state interests and petitioners’ First Amendment rights are not inherently incompatible. To the extent they are in this case, the State of California has made them so by forcing political parties to associate with those who do not share their beliefs. And it has done this at the “crucial juncture” at which party members traditionally find their collective voice and select their spokesman. The burden Proposition 198 places on petitioners’ rights of political association is both severe and unnecessary. The judgment for the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
Term limits
Cal. Constitution Art. IV secs. 1.5, 2, 4.5, 7.5; Art. V sec. 11; Art. IX sec. 2; Art. XIII sec. 17
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE 4: LEGISLATIVE
SEC. 1.5. The people find and declare that the Founding Fathers established a system of representative government based upon free, fair, and competitive elections. The increased concentration of political power in the hands of incumbent representatives has made our electoral system less free, less competitive, and less representative.
The ability of legislators to serve unlimited number of terms, to establish their own retirement system, and to pay for staff and support services at state expense contribute heavily to the extremely high number of incumbents who are reelected. These unfair incumbent advantages discourage qualified candidates from seeking public office and create a class of career politicians, instead of the citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding Fathers. These career politicians become representatives of the bureaucracy, rather than of the people whom they are elected to represent.
To restore a free and democratic system of fair elections, and to encourage qualified candidates to seek public office, the people find and declare that the powers of incumbency must be limited. Retirement benefits must be restricted, state-financed incumbent staff and support services limited, and limitations placed upon the number of terms which may be served.
[If this passage strikes you as being odd sort of rhetoric for a constitution, you should know that Section 1.5 was the Preamble to Prop 140, a term-limits initiative constitutional amendment approved by the People in 1990. It restricted service of members of the Assembly to three two-year terms and members of the Senate to two four-year terms. It also imposed a lifetime ban on further service once these specified limits had been reached. After defeating two efforts to modify these strict limits by initiative in 2002 and 2008, in 2012 the People approved Prop 28, under which an individual may serve a total of twelve years in either the Senate or the Assembly or both, though the total years of service in the legislature was reduced from 14 to 12. This had the effect of increasing the total time and individual could serve in either house to twelve years. Prop. 140 also approved the following restrictions:]
SEC. 4.5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution or existing law, a person elected to or serving in the Legislature on or after November 1, 1990, shall participate in the Federal Social Security (Retirement, Disability, Health Insurance) Program and the State shall pay only the employer’s share of the contribution necessary to such participation. No other pension or retirement benefit shall accrue as a result of service in the Legislature, such service not being intended as a career occupation. This Section shall not be construed to abrogate or diminish any vested pension or retirement benefit which may have accrued under an existing law to a person holding or having held office in the Legislature, but upon adoption of this Act no further entitlement to nor vesting in any existing program shall accrue to any such person, other than Social Security to the extent herein provided.
SEC. 7.5. In the fiscal year immediately following the adoption of this Act, the total aggregate expenditures of the Legislature for the compensation of members and employees of, and the operating expenses and equipment for, the Legislature may not exceed an amount equal to nine hundred fifty thousand dollars ($950,000) per member for that fiscal year or 80 percent of the amount of money expended for those purposes in the preceding fiscal year, whichever is less. For each fiscal year thereafter, the total aggregate expenditures may not exceed an amount equal to that expended for those purposes in the preceding fiscal year, adjusted and compounded by an amount equal to the percentage increase in the appropriations limit for the State established pursuant to Article XIII B.
[Prop 140 also imposed the following limitations in other Articles. The added provisions are noted in italics.]
ARTICLE 5: EXECUTIV
SEC. 11. The Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller, Secretary of State, and Treasurer shall be elected at the same time and places and for the same term as the Governor. No Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller, Secretary of State, or Treasurer may serve in the same office for more than 2 terms.
ARTICLE 9 EDUCATION
SEC. 2. A Superintendent of Public Instruction shall be elected by the qualified electors of the State at each gubernatorial election. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall enter upon the duties of the office on the first Monday after the first day of January next succeeding each gubernatorial election. No Superintendent of Public Instruction may serve more than 2 terms.
ARTICLE 13 TAXATION
SEC. 17. The Board of Equalization consists of 5 voting members: the Controller and 4 members elected for 4-year terms at gubernatorial elections. The State shall be divided into four Board of Equalization districts with the voters of each district electing one member. No member may serve more than 2 terms.
Legislature v. Eu (1991), 54 Cal.3d 492
LUCAS, Chief Justice.
In this proceeding, we consider constitutional challenges to an initiative measure adopted at the November 6, 1990, General Election. This measure, entitled by its framers “The Political Reform Act of 1990,” was designated on the ballot as Proposition 140. Its stated purpose is to “restore a free and democratic system of fair elections, and to encourage qualified candidates to seek public office” by limiting “the powers of incumbency.” The measure seeks to accomplish these goals by these three separate reforms: “Retirement benefits [of legislators] must be restricted, state-financed incumbent staff and support services limited, and limitations placed upon the number of terms which may be served.” Petitioners herein include the California Legislature (both Senate and Assembly), certain individual legislators from both houses, and various citizens, voters and taxpayers. Petitioners jointly assert a variety of challenges to the constitutionality of Proposition 140.
B. Constitutional Revision or Amendment
Turning to petitioners’ constitutional challenges to Proposition 140, they first contend that the measure, and particularly its term and budgetary limitations on the Legislature, effected a constitutional revision rather than a mere amendment. Petitioners contend that the combined effects of the foregoing term and budgetary limitations on California’s “basic governmental plan” will be as devastating and far reaching as those involved in the provision of Proposition 115 invalidated by us in Raven v. Deukmejian. They thus assert that Proposition 140 has achieved a qualitative revision of the Constitution. We disagree.
Proposition 140 on its face does not affect either the structure or the foundational powers of the Legislature, which remains free to enact whatever laws it deems appropriate. The challenged measure alters neither the content of those laws nor the process by which they are adopted. No legislative power is diminished or delegated to other persons or agencies. The relationships between the three governmental branches, and their respective powers, remain untouched.
Second, although the immediate foreseeable effects of the foregoing term and budgetary limitations are indeed substantial (primarily, the eventual loss of experienced legislators and some support staff), the assertedly momentous consequences to our governmental scheme are largely speculative ones, dependent on a number of as yet unproved premises.
We are in no position to resolve the controversy between the parties regarding the long-term consequences of Proposition 140, for the future effects of that measure on our “basic governmental plan” are simply unfathomable at this time. Indeed, that very uncertainty inhibits us from holding that a constitutional revision has occurred in this case. Our prior decisions have made it clear that to find such a revision, it must necessarily or inevitably appear from the face of the challenged provision that the measure will substantially alter the basic governmental framework set forth in our Constitution.
It seems indisputable that Proposition 140 represents an attempt by the people to “alter or reform” their own government. To construe article XVIII as vesting the Legislature with a power to veto such reform measures would be seriously inconsistent with the democratic principles expressed in article II. If, as petitioners predict, Proposition 140 ultimately produces grave, undesirable consequences to our governmental plan, the Legislature or the people are empowered to propose a new constitutional amendment to correct the situation. Resolving, as we must, all doubts in favor of the initiative process, we conclude that nothing on the face of Proposition 140 effects a constitutional revision.
1. Character and Extent of Injury to Protected Rights
Two important rights are affected by Proposition 140, namely, the incumbent’s right to run for public office, and the voters’ right to reelect the incumbent to that office. Consequently, the “injury” to those rights resulting from the application of Proposition 140 is also twofold, namely, lifetime exclusion of the incumbent from the office previously held, and a corresponding permanent inability of the voters to return the incumbent to that office.
a. Effect on Candidates
As previously explained, Proposition 140 imposes a lifetime ban on legislators once they have completed the maximum number of terms
b. Effect on Voters
Petitioners also stress the impact on the voters who are prevented from casting their ballots for the particular candidate of their choice. Just as incumbent legislators are permanently barred from running for another term once they have served the prescribed numbers of terms, the voters are permanently barred from voting for such persons, at least for the legislative office they once held. According to petitioners, the voters thus will be denied the right to vote for those persons who arguably possess the best qualifications.
Additionally, petitioners note that because Proposition 140 was adopted on a statewide basis, “the disability [on candidates and voters] is imposed not by those who have the right to vote for the candidate, but rather by those outside the district.” Petitioners thus suggest the resulting impact on or injury to the voters is aggravated or enhanced by reason of the ability of voters residing outside a particular voting district to essentially “veto” particular candidates within that district.
c. Summary of Impact on Candidates and Voters
In sum, although Proposition 140 does affect the rights of voters and candidates to a degree, there are several mitigating aspects, including the voters’ continued right to vote for any qualified candidates, as well as the candidates’ ability to run for other public offices, their entitlement to a significant period of service in office before the term limitations apply, and the “prospective” application of the limitation provision. Additionally, we should bear in mind that it is presently unclear under federal law whether and to what extent voters retain a constitutional right to vote for particular candidates such as the incumbent legislators affected by the challenged measure. Thus, the legal impact of Proposition 140 on the voters remains uncertain.
Having discussed the extent of the “asserted injury to the rights protected” we next analyze the “precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule”
2. The Interests of the State
Balanced against the foregoing negative impact on candidates and voters flowing from the challenged measure are the considerable state interests assertedly promoted thereby. In the words of new article IV, section 1.5, of the state Constitution, term limitations are deemed necessary to restore “free, fair, and competitive elections,” to “encourage qualified candidates to seek public office,” and to eliminate “unfair incumbent advantages” that have resulted in an “extremely high number of incumbents” and created “a class of career politicians” instead of the “citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding Fathers.”
[Quoting from a West Virginia case, (State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney (1976) 159 W.Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607, 611, Chief Justice Lucas continued:] The universal authority is that restriction upon the succession of incumbents serves a rational public policy and that, while restrictions may deny qualified men an opportunity to serve, as a general rule the over-all health of the body politic is enhanced by limitations on continuous tenure In sum, despite its distinguishing features, we conclude that Maloney’s analysis is quite pertinent to our determination whether permanent incumbency limitations are supported by legitimate and compelling considerations. We conclude they are so supported.
3. Necessity of Imposing Restrictions
We turn next to the “necessity” of imposing the restrictions of Proposition 140 on the dual rights at issue here . Petitioners contend that a lifetime ban on candidacy was unnecessary, and that other less “drastic” alternatives, such as a limitation on consecutive terms, together with additional restrictions on campaign contributions to legislators, decreased fringe and pension benefits, and additional incentives for early retirement, would have been sufficient to promote and accomplish the state interests previously discussed.
We conclude that the less drastic alternatives suggested by petitioners would have been inadequate to accomplish the declared purpose of Proposition 140 to eliminate the “class of career politicians” that assertedly had been created by virtue of the “unfair incumbent advantages” referred to in that measure.
4. Conclusion
On balance, we conclude the interests of the state in incumbency reform outweigh any injury to incumbent office holders and those who would vote for them. As Maloney observed, no decisions of the United States Supreme Court have been found that suggest a limitation on incumbency would be unconstitutional. Although such limitations may restrict the franchise, if we use a balancing test that weighs “the enlargement of the franchise by guaranteeing competitive primary and general elections” against “incidental disenfranchisement” of some voters, the court “must conclude that restrictive provisions on the succession of incumbents do not frustrate but rather further the policy of the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. Conclusion
We conclude that, except for the restriction on pensions of incumbent legislators, Proposition 140 is constitutionally valid.
Secret ballot
Peterson v. City of San Diego (1983), 34 Cal.3d 225
BROUSSARD, J.
Article II, section 7 of the California Constitution states: “Voting shall be secret.” The issue presented is whether the provision is violated by an election conducted by mail ballot. We conclude that such elections are valid.
Plaintiff contends that to assure the integrity of the ballot article II, section 7 should be interpreted to require not only that the voter’s right to secrecy be protected by election procedures but also that the voters be required to cast their votes in secret. Unless the voter is required to cast his ballot in secret, plaintiff points out, the voter may demonstrate to another person how he has cast his ballot, opening the door to fraud, coercion, intimidation, and undue influence
As to secrecy, absentee voting in polling place elections and voting by mail in all mailed ballot elections are substantially the same. In absentee voting the voter must apply for a ballot. The voter marks the ballot and returns it in person or by mail to the clerk or to a precinct polling place. In mailed ballot elections the clerk mails each voter a ballot, and the voter marks it and returns it to the clerk by mail or in person or may mark it in the clerk’s office and leave it with the clerk. Elections Code section 1350 requires that mail ballot elections be conducted in accordance with the procedures used for absentee voting.
Mail ballot elections serve two purposes as compared to voting-booth elections. First, voting by mail is often more convenient than voting at the polling place and mail voting increases voter participation. Second, mail balloting can provide significant economies in the administration of elections permitting agencies to call special elections with relatively little cost to ascertain voter sentiment on pending issues
The right to vote is, of course, fundamental, and restrictions on exercise of the franchise will be strictly scrutinized and invalidated unless promotive of a compelling governmental interest. The United States Supreme Court has stressed on numerous occasions, ”The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.“ The right is fundamental ”because preservative of all rights.“ Rather than being a creature of the California Constitution, the right of suffrage in this as in every other state of the Union flows from the well-springs of our national political heritage.”
The fundamental importance of the right to vote persuades us that reasonable efforts by the Legislature to facilitate and increase its exercise must be upheld. Too often citizens faced with numerous pressures on their time and with the inconvenience of appearing at the polling place have chosen to forego exercise of the precious right. Reducing or eliminating the burdens and inconvenience of voting and thereby increasing voter participation is not only a proper subject of legislation but also fundamental to the maintenance of our representative government.
We are satisfied that the secrecy provision of our Constitution was never intended to preclude reasonable measures to facilitate and increase exercise of the right to vote such as absentee and mail ballot voting. We may not assume that the secrecy provision was designed to serve a purpose other than its obvious one of protecting the voter’s right to act in secret, when such an assumption would impair rather than facilitate exercise of the fundamental right.
Our construction of the secrecy provision is supported by the history of the constitutional provision governing voting. For many years, provision *231for absentee voting and the secrecy provision were both in the Constitution with neither stated as an exception or limitation on the other
We conclude that the secrecy provision does not preclude voting by mail. The judgment is affirmed.
GRODIN, J., concurring.
Plaintiff voices a concern which I share. It is a concern with the integrity of the election process, and it extends beyond the proposition that voters should be free to cast their ballots in secret.
To say that the constitutional mandate for secrecy in voting is implicated when votes are cast away from the polling booth is not to say that it is violated. I agree with the majority that the historical development of absentee voting in this state makes quite clear a constitutional intent to permit the Legislature discretion in providing for absentee ballots. Thus, I would not read article II, section 7 as an absolute requirement that all voting take place at the polling booth. Rather, I would read it as requiring that departures from that principle be justified in terms of the values of the election process.
In the case of absentee ballots, the fundamental nature of the right to vote provides the requisite justification. If a voter would for any reason have difficulty getting to the polls, a system which permits him to vote by absentee ballot serves that fundamental interest. At the same time, the relatively small percentage of voters who are likely to vote by absentee ballot in any election constitutes some safeguard against the risks inherent in voting outside the polling place
The same justification does not exist in the case of mail ballots. So long as absentee ballots are available, one cannot speak meaningfully of a person’s right to vote being limited by having to go to the polls. Rather, the wholesale departure from polling place voting which mail balloting represents can be justified only by a different interest — the public interest in increasing voter participation. It is voter apathy, not disability, for which mail balloting is prescribed as an antidote.
I am prepared to accept that justification in this case, where what is involved is a special local election on an issue as to which legitimating consensus is both significant and difficult to obtain in an election conducted by traditional means. I therefore concur in the court’s opinion, but would reserve judgment as to the constitutionality of mail ballots in broader contexts.
Wilks v. Mouton (1986), 42 Cal.3d 400
THE COURT.
Appellants seek to invalidate a municipal incorporation election on the ground that there were irregularities in the handling of certain absentee ballots. The trial court found that there had been no violation of any mandatory provision of the Elections Code or tampering with or fraud involving the ballots, and it confirmed the passage of the incorporation measure. We agree.
Appellants assert that at least 94 of the absentee ballots were illegally cast because of the manner in which the ballots were obtained and delivered, because there had been a breach of the right of secret balloting, and because of the alleged nonresidence of certain voters.
It is a primary principle of law as applied to election contests that it is the duty of the court to validate the election if possible. That is to say, the election must be held valid unless plainly illegal. Accordingly, a distinction has been developed between mandatory and directory provisions in election laws; a violation of a mandatory provision vitiates the election, whereas a departure from a directory provision does not render the election void if there is a substantial observance of the law and no showing that the result of the election has been changed or the rights of the voters injuriously affected by the deviation Even mandatory provisions must be liberally construed to avoid thwarting the fair expression of popular will. In addition, there is an express legislative policy requiring liberal construction of absentee ballot provisions in favor of the absent voter.
Appellants contend that the secret voting provision of the California ConstitutionFN4 was violated in the case of 45 absentee ballots voted in the presence of or with the assistance of 3 incorporation proponents. The trial court found that in each case where an incorporation proponent had assisted a voter in completing an absentee ballot, the assistance had been provided at the voter’s request. The court also found that the assistance had been provided without fraud or coercion, and that all disclosures had been made voluntarily by the voter. Finally, the court concluded that no ballot had been tampered with, and that in all cases the vote cast reflected the decision of the voter.
These factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. Appellants argue that even accepting the trial court’s findings as true, the intrusion by campaign workers on the secrecy of voting requires that the ballots be invalidated even where disclosures are voluntary and in the absence of tampering. We disagree.
The statutory provisions regulating absentee voting do not prohibit the voter from permitting third parties to be present while the voter marks his ballot. Neither do these provisions specify what class of absentee voter may use third parties to actually mark the ballot. The trial court found that each voter had voluntarily allowed the campaign workers to be present while the voter marked the ballot, and had requested whatever assistance was provided in marking the ballots. The trial court found that each ballot was marked as the voter had requested and that there was no coercion or tampering. Appellants’ request that we nonetheless invalidate each of the votes cast because it was not cast in secret is inconsistent with our obligation in reviewing a contested election to protect the individual’s exercise of the franchise in the absence of manifest illegality
The trial court determined that there had been no fraud, coercion or tampering in connection with any of the challenged ballots. The court determined that every voter who had disclosed his ballot to a third party had done so voluntarily. Most voters who disclosed their ballots did so because they needed help in view of their age, infirmity or illiteracy. There was substantial compliance with the essential provisions of the absentee voter provisions of the Elections Code. Under these circumstances we will not deprive the individuals who cast the challenged ballots of the exercise of their fundamental right to vote.
The judgment is affirmed.
Voter qualifications and felon disfranchisement (see infra XIII.O.)
Redistricting
Cal. Constitution Art. XXI
Article 21 Redistricting of Senate, Assembly, Congressional and Board of Equalization Districts
Section 1. In the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade, the Citizens Redistricting Commission described in Section 2 shall adjust the boundary lines of the congressional, State Senatorial, Assembly, and Board of Equalization districts (also known as “redistricting”) in conformance with the standards and process set forth in Section 2.
Sec. 2. (a) The Citizens Redistricting Commission shall be created no later than December 31 in 2010, and in each year ending in the number zero thereafter.
(b) The commission shall: (1) conduct an open and transparent process enabling full public consideration of and comment on the drawing of district lines; (2) draw district lines according to the redistricting criteria specified in this article; and (3) conduct themselves with integrity and fairness.
(c) (1) The selection process is designed to produce a commission that is independent from legislative influence and reasonably representative of this State’s diversity.
(2) The commission shall consist of 14 members, as follows: five who are registered with the largest political party in California based on registration, five who are registered with the second largest political party in California based on registration, and four who are not registered with either of the two largest political parties in California based on registration.
(3) Each commission member shall be a voter who has been continuously registered in California with the same political party or unaffiliated with a political party and who has not changed political party affiliation for five or more years immediately preceding the date of his or her appointment. Each commission member shall have voted in two of the last three statewide general elections immediately preceding his or her application.
(4) The term of office of each member of the commission expires upon the appointment of the first member of the succeeding commission.
(5) Nine members of the commission shall constitute a quorum. Nine or more affirmative votes shall be required for any official action. The four final redistricting maps must be approved by at least nine affirmative votes which must include at least three votes of members registered from each of the two largest political parties in California based on registration and three votes from members who are not registered with either of these two political parties.
(6) Each commission member shall apply this article in a manner that is impartial and that reinforces public confidence in the integrity of the redistricting process. A commission member shall be ineligible for a period of 10 years beginning from the date of appointment to hold elective public office at the federal, state, county, or city level in this State. A member of the commission shall be ineligible for a period of five years beginning from the date of appointment to hold appointive federal, state, or local public
office, to serve as paid staff for, or as a paid consultant to, the Board of Equalization, the Congress, the Legislature, or any individual legislator, or to register as a federal, state or local lobbyist in this State.
(d) The commission shall establish single-member districts for the Senate, Assembly, Congress, and State Board of Equalization pursuant to a mapping process using the following criteria as set forth in the following order of priority:
(1) Districts shall comply with the United States Constitution. Congressional districts shall achieve population equality as nearly as is practicable, and Senatorial, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization districts shall have reasonably equal population with
other districts for the same office, except where deviation is required to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act or allowable bylaw.
(2) Districts shall comply with the federal Voting Rights Act (42U.S.C. Sec. 1971 and following).
(3) Districts shall be geographically contiguous.
(4) The geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local neighborhood, or local community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes their division to the extent possible without violating the requirements of any of the preceding subdivisions. A community of interest is a contiguous population which shares common social and economic interests that should be included within a single district for purposes of its effective and fair representation. Examples of such shared interests are those common to an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area, and those common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same media of communication relevant to the election process.
Communities of interest shall not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.
(5) To the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above, districts shall be drawn to encourage geographical compactness such that nearby areas of population are not bypassed for more distant population.
(6) To the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above, each Senate district shall be comprised o two whole, complete, and adjacent Assembly districts, and each Board of Equalization district shall be comprised of 10 whole, complete and adjacent Senate districts.
(e) The place of residence of any incumbent or political candidate shall not be considered in the creation of a map. Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political party.
(f) Districts for the Congress, Senate, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization shall be numbered consecutively commencing at the northern boundary of the State and ending at the southern boundary.
(g) By August 15 in 2011, and in each year ending in the number one thereafter, the commission shall approve four final maps that separately set forth the district boundary lines for the congressional, Senatorial, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization districts. Upon approval, the commission shall certify the four final maps to the Secretary of State.
(h) The commission shall issue, with each of the four final maps, a report that explains the basis on which the commission made its decisions in achieving compliance with the criteria listed in subdivision (d) and shall include definitions of the terms and standards used in drawing each final map.
(i) Each certified final map shall be subject to referendum in the same manner that a statute is subject to referendum pursuant to Section 9 of Article II. The date of certification of a final map to the Secretary of State shall be deemed the enactment date for purposes of Section 9 of Article II.
(j) If the commission does not approve a final map by at least the requisite votes or if voters disapprove a certified final map in a referendum, the Secretary of State shall immediately petition the California Supreme Court for an order directing the appointment of special masters to adjust the boundary lines of that map in accordance with the redistricting criteria and requirements set forth in subdivisions (d), (e), and (f). Upon its approval of the masters’ map, the court shall certify the resulting map to the Secretary of State, which map shall constitute the certified final map for the subject type of district.
Sec. 3. (a) The commission has the sole legal standing to defend any action regarding a certified final map, and shall inform the Legislature if it determines that funds or other resources provided for the operation of the commission are not adequate. The Legislature shall provide adequate funding to defend any action regarding a certified map. The commission has sole authority to determine whether the Attorney General or other legal counsel retained by the commission shall assist in the defense of a certified final map.
(b) (1) The California Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in all proceedings in which a certified final map is challenged or is claimed not to have taken timely effect.
(2) Any registered voter in this state may file a petition for writ of mandate or writ of prohibition, within 45 days after the commission has certified a final map to the Secretary of State, to bar the Secretary of State from implementing the plan on the grounds that the filed plan violates this Constitution, the United States Constitution, or any federal or state statute. Any registered voter in this state may also file a petition for a writ of mandate or writ of prohibition to seek relief where a certified final map is subject to a referendum measure that is likely to qualify and stay the timely implementation of the map.
(3) The California Supreme Court shall give priority to ruling on a petition for a writ of mandate or a writ of prohibition filed pursuant to paragraph (2). If the court determines that a final certified map violates this Constitution, the United States Constitution, or any federal or state statute, the court shall fashion the relief that it deems appropriate, including, but not limited to, the relief set forth in subdivision (j) of Section 2.
Legislature v. Deukmejian (1983), 34 Cal.3d 658
THE COURT.
In this case we are called upon to determine the constitutionality of an attempt — novel in the history of this state — to readjust state legislative and congressional district boundaries through the statutory initiative process after the Legislature has already done so. We are asked by the proponents of the initiative to create an exception to the constitutionally mandated and long-established rule that redistricting may occur only once within the 10-year period following a federal census. We conclude, based upon the principle that in the enactment of statutes the constitutional limitations that bind the Legislature apply with equal force to the people’s reserved power of initiative, that such an exception cannot be justified. Therefore, the proposed initiative is constitutionally impermissible and may not be submitted to the voters.
The initiative, if adopted, would realign the Assembly, Senate and congressional districts of California and repeal statutes enacted by the Legislature during the 1983-1984 First Extraordinary Session. The principal claim of both the legislative and congressional petitioners is that the initiative measure is invalid because it represents an attempt to redistrict more than once in a decennial period — an attempt which both sets of petitioners say is barred by article XXI of the California Constitution
Factual Background
In September 1981 the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, three statutes redefining the state’s congressional, Senate and Assembly districts. Referenda petitions subjecting the statutes to voter approval were accepted by the Secretary of State in December 1981.The 1981 statutes were rejected by the voters at the June 1982 referenda election. At the First Extraordinary Session of 1982-1983, convened in December 1982, the Legislature enacted chapter 6, establishing new boundaries for congressional districts, and chapter 8, doing the same for Senate and Assembly districts. Both chapters were signed by then Governor Brown on January 2, 1983.As an urgency statute, chapter 8 was not subject to a referendum. The legislative and the congressional petitioners argue that because both chapter 6 and chapter 8 will be effective prior to December 14, 1983, the date upon which the initiative would become effective if adopted by the voters, it may not be adopted because only one valid reapportionment plan for these districts between each decennial federal census is permitted by article XXI. For reasons that we shall explain, we agree
[The Court then held that since adoption of the 1879 Constitution, reapportionment was constitutionally permissible only once each decade. This implicit once-a-decade rule was carried over into adoption of the predecessor of current Article XXI.]
Real Parties’ Challenge to the Application of the Established Once-a-decade Rule
Real parties in interest [the promoters of the initiative measure that would redistrict and override the legislature’s redistricting] do not question the long line of California decisions which hold that the constitutional limitation to a single, valid decennial redistricting precludes a further change in district boundaries by the Legislature. Instead, they offer a novel theory — that the limitation of article XXI applies only to the Legislature and is inapplicable to the people’s reserved initiative power.
Assuming, but not deciding, that redistricting by initiative is permissible , we find the first proposition puzzling inasmuch as the reserved power to enact statutes by initiative is a legislative power, one that would otherwise reside in the Legislature. It has heretofore been considered to be no greater with respect to the nature and attributes of the statutes that may be enacted than that of the Legislature. [The People by initiative may exercise no greater legislative power than the legislature might, and are subject to the same constitutional limitations as those that bind the legislature. Ed.] That elementary principle is dispositive of any claim that because this redistricting is to be accomplished by initiative it is exempted from the prohibition of article XXI. A statutory initiative is subject to the same state and federal constitutional limitations as are the Legislature and the statutes which it enacts. We conclude that the initiative process may not be used to do that which the Legislature may not do, to redraw legislative and congressional districts during the decade following a federal decennial census at a time when the Legislature has enacted a valid and effective statute or statutes defining those districts.
Real parties argue that we should exempt initiatives from the once-a-decade principle, suggesting at the same time that we might “create” a new rule which would allow two opportunities to redistrict each decade, once by the Legislature and once by initiative, provided the Legislature acts first. This we decline to do. The people of this state, as the ultimate source of legitimate political power, are of course free through constitutional amendment to adopt whatever changes in the existing system they consider appropriate, subject only to limitations contained in the Constitution of the United States. Whatever the merits of possible alternative constitutional mechanisms, it is manifest that our role is simply to apply the applicable constitutional provisions as they currently exist. Under the well-established constitutional principles that we have reviewed, it is clear that because one presumptively valid redistricting plan based on the 1980 census has already been adopted, article XXI prohibits the adoption of a second redistricting plan either by the Legislature or by initiative.
Let a writ of mandate issue restraining respondents from expending any public funds or otherwise acting to carry out the special election proclaimed by respondent Governor to be conducted on December 13, 1983.
[There are no materials on reapportionment because the 2010 revision of Art. XXI has rendered them of historical interest only]
Property qualifications
Cal. Constitution Art. I sec. 22
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE 1: DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
SEC. 22. The right to vote or hold office may not be conditioned by a property qualification.
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973)
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is another in the line of cases in which the Court has had occasion to consider the limits imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on legislation apportioning representation in state and local governing bodies and establishing qualifications for voters in the election of such representatives. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) enunciated the constitutional standard for apportionment of state legislatures. Later cases extended the Reynolds rule to the governing bodies of a county and of a junior college district, respectively. We are here presented with the issue:
‘Were the (county’s governing body) a special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents, we would have to confront the question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the organization’s functions.’
Appellee district consists of 193,000 acres of intensively cultivated, highly fertile farm land located in the Tulare Lake Basin. Its population consists of 77 persons, including 18 children, most of whom are employees of one or another of the four corporations that farm 85% of the land in the district.
Such districts are authorized to plan projects and execute approved projects ‘for the acquisition, appropriation, diversion, storage, conservation, and distribution of water . . ..’ Incidental to this general power, districts may ‘acquire, improve, and operate’ any necessary works for the storage and distribution of water as well as any drainage or reclamation works connected therewith, and the generation and distribution of hydroelectric power may be provided for. They may fix tolls and charges for the use of water and collect them from all persons receiving the benefit of the water or other services in proportion to the services rendered. The costs of the projects are assessed against district land in accordance with the benefits accruing to each tract held in separate ownership.
Governance of the districts is undertaken by a board of directors. Each director is elected from one of the divisions within the district, and each must take an official oath and execute a bond. General elections for the directors are to be held in odd-numbered years.
It is the voter qualification for such elections that appellants claim invidiously discriminates against them and persons similarly situated. Appellants are landowners, a landowner-lessee, and residents within the area included in the appellee’s water storage district. They brought this action under 42 U.S.C. s 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in an effort to prevent appellee from giving effect to certain provisions of the California Water Code. They allege that [the statutes in question] unconstitutionally deny to them the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that only landowners are permitted to vote in water storage district general elections, and votes in those elections are apportioned according to the assessed valuation of the land.
In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), a case in which the Ohio legislative scheme for regulating the electoral franchise was challenged, the Court said:
‘(T)his Court has firmly established the principle that the Equal Protection Clause does not make every minor difference in the application of laws to different groups a violation of our Constitution. But we have also held many times that ‘invidious’ distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.
We therefore turn now to the determination of whether the California statutory scheme establishing water storage districts violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The appellee district in this case, although vested with some typical governmental powers, has relatively limited authority. Its primary purpose, indeed the reason for its existence, is to provide for the acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin. It provides no other general public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body. There are no towns, shops, hospitals, or other facilities designed to improve the quality of life within the district boundaries, and it does not have a fire department, police, buses, or trains.
Not only does the district not exercise what might be thought of as ‘normal governmental’ authority, but its actions disproportionately affect landowners. All of the costs of district projects are assessed against land by assessors in proportion to the benefits received. Likewise, charges for services rendered are collectible from persons receiving their benefit in proportion to the services. When such persons are delinquent in payment, just as in the case of delinquency in payments of assessments, such charges become a lien on the land. In short, there is no way that the economic burdens of district operations can fall on residents qua residents, and the operations of the districts primarily affect the land within their boundaries. Under these circumstances, it is quite understandable that the statutory framework for election of directors of the appellee focuses on the land benefited, rather than on people as such.
We hold, therefore, that the popular election requirements enunciated by Reynolds and succeeding cases are inapplicable to elections such as the general election of appellee Water Storage District. Even though appellants derive no benefit from the Reynolds lines of cases, they are, of course, entitled to have their equal protection claim assessed to determine whether the State’s decision to deny the franchise to residents of the district while granting it to landowners was ‘wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation’s objectives,’
The California Legislature could quite reasonably have concluded that the number of landowners and owners of sufficient amounts of acreage whose consent was necessary to organize the district would not have subjected their land to the lien of its possibly very substantial assessments unless they had a dominant voice in its control. Since the subjection of the owners’ lands to such liens was the basis by which the district was to obtain financing, the proposed district had as a practical matter to attract landowner support. Nor, since assessments against landowners were to be the sole means by which the expenses of the district were to be paid, could it be said to be unfair or inequitable to repose the franchise in landowners but not residents. Landowners as a class were to bear the entire burden of the district’s costs, and the State could rationally conclude that they, to the exclusion of residents, should be charged with responsibility for its operation. We conclude, therefore, that nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precluded California from limiting the voting for directors of appellee district by totally excluding those who merely reside within the district.
First Amendment issues in elections
Cal. Constitution Art. II sec. 7; Art. VII sec. 10
Article 2 Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and Recall
Section 1. All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require
Sec. 2. A United States citizen 18 years of age and resident in this State may vote.
Sec. 2.5. A voter who casts a vote in an election in accordance with the laws of this State shall have that vote counted.
Sec. 3. The Legislature shall define residence and provide for registration and free elections.
Sec. 4. The Legislature shall prohibit improper practices that affect elections and shall provide for the disqualification of electors while mentally incompetent or imprisoned or on parole for the conviction of a felony.
Sec. 6. (a) All judicial, school, county, and city offices, including the Superintendent of Public Instruction, shall be nonpartisan.
(b) A political party or party central committee shall not nominate a candidate for nonpartisan office, and the candidate’s party preference shall not be included on the ballot for the nonpartisan office.
Sec. 7. Voting shall be secret.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. Because of the importance of the constitutional issues involved, we granted the separate petitions for certiorari of the individual petitioners and of the We reverse the judgment. We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection. The question is whether it forfeits that protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged defamation of respondent.
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth– whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials –and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker. Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need * * * to survive.”
Injury to official reputation error affords no more warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free than does factual error. Where judicial officers are involved, this Court has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision. This is true even though the utterance contains ‘half-truths’ and ‘misinformation.’ Such repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and present danger of the obstruction of justice .If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements is no less inadequate. This is the lesson to be drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798, which first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment. Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history. Fines levied in its prosecution were repaid by Act of Congress on the ground that it was unconstitutional.
The state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions –and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount –leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ –that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Reversed and remanded.
Communist Party v. Peek (1942), 20 Cal.3d 536
Communist Party of United States of America v. Peek (1942),
20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889
GIBSON, C. J.
In this action plaintiffs challenge the validity of [California statutes that ban any political party with the word “communist” in its name from participating in primary elections.] Before entering upon the task of examining the constitutionality of this legislation, it would be well to set forth briefly certain of the fundamental principles which must guide our deliberations.
First, the right of suffrage, everywhere recognized as one of the fundamental attributes of our form of government, is guaranteed and secured by the Constitution of this state to all citizens who are within the requirements therein provided. This constitutional right of the individual citizen includes the right to vote “at all elections which are now or may hereafter be authorized by law,” including the right to vote at primary elections. Second, although the Legislature’s power to pass laws regulating the conduct of elections was conceded under Constitution, article XX, section 11, the Legislature was wholly without power, prior to the adoption of article II, section 2 1/2, in 1900, to exclude any citizen from participation in a primary election who was within the terms of the constitutional provision. In this country, the right to vote is recognized as one of the highest privileges of the citizen. It is so recognized not only by the citizen, but by the law; and any attempted infringement by legislative power upon that right as granted by the Constitution is idle legislation. If the Legislature by this act has deprived citizens of the right of participate in the elections therein provided, who are qualified to participate under the Constitution — aye, even if the Legislature has deprived one citizen so qualified of such right — the act is void as an attempted exercise of power it does not possess. Section 11, article XX, of the Constitution authorizes the Legislature to pass laws in support of the privilege of free suffrage. This does not mean the authorization of laws looking toward the curtailment and deprivation of free suffrage.” Third, the inability of the Legislature to infringe the citizen’s constitutional right of suffrage prior to 1900 meant that, in any situation where the party system was an integral part of the elective machinery, the Legislature could not deny to a particular political party the right to participate in a given decision. The power of the Legislature to restrict the right of suffrage is limited to prescribing tests and conditions for participation in primary elections which are reasonable and not arbitrary. It follows, therefore, that the legislation challenged in this action is valid as a restriction upon the fundamental right of suffrage only if it comes within the limited power conferred upon the Legislature by California Constitution, article II, section 2 1/2, to prescribe reasonable tests and conditions for participation by parties and individuals in primary elections.
We can, however, find no reasonable ground upon which such a restriction [banning parties whose name includes the word “communist”] of the constitutional right of suffrage can be justified. Assuming for the moment, therefore, that the Legislature has power to deny the use of the primary election machinery to particular groups of dangerous citizens, it does not follow that it may do so by a statute which merely operates to deny to such groups the use of a particular name. Such legislation is particularly unfortunate when made the basis for restricting so fundamental a right as that of free suffrage. The statute has no reasonable relation to the goal at which the Legislature presumedly aimed, and it must be held invalid as unreasonable
Defendants urge that this court can take judicial notice of the fact that the Communist Party advocates the overthrow of the government by force and violence. The doctrine of judicial notice was adopted as a judicial short-cut to avoid necessity for the formal introduction of evidence in certain cases where there is no real need for such evidence. Before a court will take judicial notice of any fact, however, that fact must be a matter of common and general knowledge, well established and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain. The test is whether sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact to make it proper to assume its existence without proof. Tested by these standards, the doctrine has no place in the present case. Not only do plaintiffs vigorously assert that the Communist Party does not advocate force and violence, but the decided cases have definitely demonstrated that the fact here alleged to exist is not the subject of judicial notice.
It was suggested at oral argument that the prohibition against use of the word “communist” may be sustained because the statute can be said to contain an implied finding by the Legislature that the Communist Party advocates the forceful overthrow of the government. It is said that this implied legislative finding, even though on a controversial issue, is binding on the courts. To state the contention is to refute it. Aside from the fact that it is not the function of the Legislature to determine whether a statute declaring a general policy has been violated in a particular case, that being a judicial function, it is clear that a statute which purports to determine that a particular person or group has violated a general law is special in nature, and violates article IV, section 25, subdivision 11, of the Constitution, which provides: “The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases. … Eleventh-Providing for conducting elections. “
For the reasons stated, the court erred in sustaining general demurrers to the complaint. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the trial court is directed to issue its order to show cause as provided in section 2900 of the Elections Code.