Cal. Constitution Art. VI secs. 1, 13, 14, 16

Article 6 Judicial

Sec. 1. The judicial power of this state is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and superior courts, all of which are courts of record.

Sec. 13. No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

Sec. 14. The legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of such opinions of the supreme court and courts of appeal as the Supreme court deems appropriate, and those opinions shall be available for publication by any person.  Decisions of the supreme court and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated.

Sec. 16. (a) Judges of the supreme court shall be elected at large. And judges of courts of appeal shall be elected in their districts at general elections at the same time and places as the governor. Their terms are 12 years beginning the Monday after January 1 following their election, except that a judge elected to an unexpired term serves the remainder of the term. In creating a new court of appeal district or division the legislature shall provide that the first elective terms are 4, 8, and 12 years.

(d) (1) Within 30 days before August 16 preceding the expiration of the judge’s term, a judge of the supreme court or a court of appeal may file a declaration of candidacy to succeed to the office presently held by the judge. If the declaration is not filed, the

Governor before September 16 shall nominate a candidate. At the next general election, only the candidate so declared or nominated may appear on the ballot, which shall present the question whether the candidate shall be elected. The candidate shall be elected upon receiving a majority of the votes on the question. A candidate not elected may not be appointed to that court but later may be nominated and elected.

(2) The governor shall fill vacancies in those courts by appointment. An appointee holds office until the Monday after January 1 following the first general election at which the appointee had the right to become a candidate or until an elected judge qualifies. A nomination or appointment by the governor is effective when confirmed by the commission on judicial appointments.

Judicial authority

McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1989), 49 Cal.3d 348

McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1989) 49 Cal.3d 348, 777 P.2d 91

LUCAS, C. J.

In this appeal we consider whether a provision of the Santa Monica Rent Control Charter Amendment which provides for administrative adjudication of excess rent claims and imposition of treble damages is unconstitutional because it permits the Santa Monica Rent Control Board (Board) to exercise judicial powers in violation of article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution. We will conclude that administrative adjudication of excess rent claims under the Charter Amendment does not, in and of itself, violate the judicial powers clause. We will hold, however, that imposition of treble damages is a power beyond the Board’s authority. We will also conclude that, on the facts of this case, the Board’s order, which authorizes immediate rent withholding, violates the judicial powers clause.

II. Analysis

A. Background

Article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution provides: “The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts, and justice courts. …” Despite the breadth of that statement, various administrative agencies in this state are authorized by the Constitution to exercise judicial powers. Some of these agencies are created by the Constitution, and are thereby vested with certain judicial powers (e.g., arts. XX, § 22 [Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control], XII [Public Utilities Commission]); others have been legislatively endowed with judicial powers pursuant to a specific constitutional authorization (see art. XIV, § 4 [Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board]; id., § 1 [“The Legislature may provide … for the general welfare of employees and for [that purpose] may confer on a commission legislative, executive, and judicial powers.”]).3 The authority of such agencies to exercise judicial powers is not at issue here.

We have often noted that agencies not vested by the Constitution with judicial powers may not exercise such powers. “Article VI disposes of all judicial power not expressly disposed of elsewhere in the Constitution …. Although the Legislature retains the authority to grant a multitude of powers to local bodies pursuant to article XI, powers of a judicial nature are no longer at its disposal.” ⁴ In this case we must determine whether the challenged Charter Amendment provision unconstitutionally authorizes the Board to exercise “judicial powers” within the meaning of article VI, section 1.

C. Constitutional Propriety of the Powers at Issue in This Cas

The challenged powers exercised by the Board in this case are of two distinct kinds: (i) the power to adjudicate “excess rent” claims, and (ii) the power to award treble damages. We address them in turn.

1. The power to make “restitutive” money awards

Prior California cases provide no direct guidance on the propriety of administrative restitutive money awards. [Finding that California precedent did not furnish an authoritative resolution of this issue, Chief Justice Lucas turned to decisions of courts of other states that had a judicial power provision in their constitutions similar to California’s.] The better analyzed and more thoughtful decisions, as we read them, set out the following guidelines: An administrative agency may constitutionally hold hearings, determine facts, apply the law to those facts, and order relief – including certain types of monetary relief – so long as (i) such activities are authorized by statute or legislation and are reasonably necessary to effectuate the administrative agency’s primary, legitimate regulatory purposes, and (ii) the “essential” judicial power (i.e., the power to make enforceable, binding judgments) remains ultimately in the courts, through review of agency determinations.

(ii) Procedural limitations on the remedial powers of administrative agencies

In addition to placing reasoned and workable substantive limitations on the remedial powers of administrative agencies, the view of the judicial powers doctrine embraced by our sister states also reserves to the courts the “true” judicial power. The decisions uphold an agency’s authority to exercise a challenged remedial power only if the administrative scheme also respects the “principle of check” by providing for judicial review of administrative determinations.

(iii) Conclusion

There is no modern decision of this state addressing the precise administrative remedial power challenged here. Our prior cases do not conflict with the approach taken by our sister states, and indeed they recognize the constitutional necessity of the “principle of check.” We believe our sister states’ approach (i.e., embracing substantive as well as procedural limitations on administrative power) reflects a practical and reasoned understanding of the judicial powers doctrine. With the following considerations and concerns in mind, we, like our sister states, conclude that administrative adjudication and awarding of restitution does not offend our Constitution’s judicial powers clause when these substantive and procedural limitations are respected.

We too will carefully apply the “reasonable necessity/legitimate regulatory purpose” requirements in order to guard against unjustified delegation of authority to decide disputes that otherwise belong in the courts.34 Specifically, we will inquire whether the challenged remedial power is authorized by legislation,35 and reasonably necessary to accomplish the administrative agency’s regulatory purposes. Furthermore, we will closely scrutinize the agency’s asserted regulatory purposes in order to ascertain whether the challenged remedial power is merely incidental to a proper, primary regulatory purpose, or whether it is in reality an attempt to transfer determination of traditional common law claims from the courts to a specialized agency whose primary purpose is the processing of such claims. Thus, for example, we would not approve the Board’s adjudication of a landlord’s common law counterclaims (extraneous to the Board’s regulatory functions) against a tenant. Such adjudication would (i) not reasonably effectuate the Board’s regulatory purposes – ensuring enforcement of rent levels – and (ii) it would shift the Board’s primary purpose from one of ensuring the enforcement of rent levels, to adjudicating a broad range of landlord-tenant disputes traditionally resolved in the courts. Finally, we will continue to apply the “principle of check” in order to reserve to the courts the “true” judicial power.

The trial court erred therefore in concluding that the Board exercised judicial powers in violation of the Constitution by adjudicating (subject to judicial review) tenants’ claims for excess rents, and ordering restitution of the excess amounts.38 We conclude, however, that the administrative orders in this case violated the “principle of check.”

(ii) The “principle of check”

The Board authorized tenant Plevka to “withhold his entire month’s rent in the first month following the Board’s decision … and the remaining monies in the months thereafter. The withheld amounts shall not form the basis for an unlawful detainer proceeding based upon nonpayment of rent.”39 Plaintiff asserts that by allowing such withholding, and by setting up the Board’s decision as a defense to any unlawful detainer action based on nonpayment of rent, the Board in practical effect issued a self-enforceable judgment, thereby violating the judicial powers clause.40 Plaintiff’s concern is significant.

We emphasize at the outset the limited question posed here. We do not consider the constitutional propriety of administrative imposition of penalties,45 nor do we consider the propriety of relatively minor “punitive damages” under statutory schemes that expressly authorize such damages, and set a cap on such awards.46 We consider only the authority of the rent control board to impose treble damages.47

Applying the “substantive limitations” prong of the test, we conclude [that] treble damages, although authorized by the Charter Amendment, may not constitutionally be imposed by the Board. First, we note that administrative agencies regularly exercise a range of powers designed to induce compliance with their regulatory authority (e.g., imposition of fines or penalties, awards of costs and attorney fees), and there is no reason to believe that such options would be insufficient here. Most significantly, however, we believe that the power to award treble damages in the present context poses a risk of producing arbitrary, disproportionate results that magnify, beyond acceptable risks, the possibility of arbitrariness inherent in any scheme of administrative adjudication.48

Accordingly, we agree with the trial court insofar as it held imposition of treble damages under the Charter Amendment violates the judicial powers clause, and enjoin future imposition of treble damages under that provision.

 

Judicial retention elections

Jed H. Shugerman, The People’s Courts: Pursuing Judicial Independence in America

 

Gerald F. Uelman, “California Judicial Retention Elections”

 

Barry Latzer, “California’s Constitutional Counterrevolution,” in G. Alan Tarr, ed., Constitutional Politics in the States

 

John T. Wold & John H. Culver, “The Defeat of the California Justices”

 

Joseph R. Grodin, “Judicial Elections: The California Experience”